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No Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman’: Response to Simion 
Abstract In a recent article in this journal1 Mona Simion argues that Sally Haslanger’s 
“engineering” approach to gender concepts such as ‘woman’ faces an epistemic objection. 
The primary function of all concepts—gender concepts included—is to represent the world, 
but Haslanger’s engineering account of ‘woman’ fails to adequately represent the world 
because, by her own admission, it doesn’t include all women in the extension of the concept 
‘woman’. I argue that this objection fails because the primary function of gender concepts—
and social kind concepts in general—is not (merely) to represent the world, but rather to 
shape it. I finish by considering the consequences for “conceptual engineering” in philosophy 
more generally. While Haslanger’s account may escape Simion’s objection, other appeals to 
conceptual engineering might not fair so well. 
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Sally Haslanger defends an “engineering” approach to philosophical analysis, with a special 
focus on race and gender concepts.2 Her basic thought is that a philosophical analysis of race 
and gender concepts should focus on what functions these concepts serve: what do they do 
                                                 
1 Mona Simion, ‘Epistemic Trouble for Engineering “Woman”’, Logos and Episteme 9, no. 1 
(2018): 91–98. 
2 See several of the essays in Sally Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and 
Social Critique (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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for us? Her answer, put broadly, is that they serve to reinforce social hierarchies. Haslanger 
offers this account of race and gender concepts in the service of the explicitly political project 
of dismantling these hierarchies. Her thought is that recognising the role played by race and 
gender concepts is an important part of this project. 
In a recent article in this journal3, Mona Simion argues that Haslanger’s engineering project 
faces a serious objection. The primary function of all concepts—gender concepts included—
is to represent the world. Just as the primary function of the concept ‘chair’ is to pick out 
chairs, the primary function of the concept ‘woman’ is to pick out women. Because 
Haslanger’s analysis of the concept ‘woman’ does not—by her own admission—pick out all 
and only women, it must be rejected. In this note I argue that Simion’s objection fails because 
some concepts—what we can call social kind concepts—have the primary function of 
shaping the world. If—as Haslanger thinks—gender (and race) concepts are social kind 
concepts, then they serve to shape the world, not (merely) to represent it. I finish by 
commenting on the consequences for Haslanger’s project, and the consequences for 
“conceptual engineering” in philosophy more generally.  
Haslanger on Gender Concepts 
I will start with an overview of Haslanger’s account of gender concepts. This overview will 
combine two elements. The first is her social constructivist account of gender categories. The 
second is her engineering approach to analysing gender concepts. As we will see, 
                                                 
3 Simion, ‘Epistemic Trouble for Engineering “Woman”’. 
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understanding how these two elements interact is crucial to understanding where Simion’s 
objection goes wrong. 
Haslanger thinks that gender categories are socially constructed. But this claim is ambiguous 
in several ways. For our purposes, the crucial distinction is between what Haslanger calls 
causal and constitutive social construction: 
X is socially constructed causally as an F iff social factors (i.e., X’s participation in a 
social matrix) play a significant role in causing X to have those features by virtue of 
which it counts as an F. 
X is socially constructed constitutively as an F iff X is of a kind or sort F such that in 
defining what it is to be F we must make reference to social factors (or, such that in order 
for X to be F, X must exist within a social matrix that constitutes Fs).4 
Some writers on social construction5 focus on the first claim, and hold that gender categories 
are socially constructed only in the sense that there are broadly social explanations why 
individuals come to have the traits associated with the gender category they fall under. 
Haslanger doesn’t deny that there may be social explanations why individuals come to have 
gendered traits. For instance, it may be that there is a (broadly) social explanation why 
women are, on average, less strong than men. But she thinks that authors like Hacking are 
                                                 
4 Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique, 131. 
5 For instance, Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999). 
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mistaken in holding that gender categories are socially constructed in merely the causal 
sense: 
I am a White woman. What does this mean? What makes this claim apt? … In effect, the 
[constitutive] constructionist proposes a different and (at least in some contexts) 
surprising set of truth conditions for the claim, truth conditions that crucially involve 
social factors. On this construal, the important social constructionist import in Beauvoir’s 
claim that “one is not born but rather becomes a woman,” is not pace Hacking … that one 
is caused to be feminine by social forces; rather, the important insight was that being a 
woman is not an anatomical matter but a social matter.6 
Haslanger’s claim is that gender categories—e.g. the category ‘woman’—can only be defined 
by reference to networks of social relations. Thus, Haslanger thinks that in defining what it is 
to belong to a gender category—e.g. to be a woman—we must make reference to social 
factors.  
While this settles the “ontological status” of gender categories—they are (constitutive) social 
constructs—it doesn’t, by itself, supply a definition of them. It is here that Haslanger applies 
her engineering approach to philosophical analysis. Her task is not to find a definition of 
‘woman’ that is extensionally adequate, but to “engineer” a definition that will best serve our 
purposes: 
[W]e begin by considering more fully the pragmatics of our talk employing the terms in 
question. What is the point of having these concepts? What cognitive or practical task do 
                                                 
6 Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique, 132. 
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they (or should they) enable us to accomplish? Are they effective tools to accomplish our 
(legitimate) purposes; if not, what concepts would serve these purposes better?7  
What are these purposes? Broadly speaking, Haslanger holds that gender concepts serve to 
reinforce existing social hierarchies, and our purposes are best served by shining a light on 
the fact that this is their function. This leads to her definition of ‘woman’: 
S is a woman iffdf S is systematically subordinated along some dimension (economic, 
political, legal, social, etc.), and S is “marked” as a target for this treatment by observed 
or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female's biological role in 
reproduction.8  
It is clear that not all women are going to fit this definition. But, given Haslanger’s purposes, 
this is beside the point. As she puts it: 
The analysis is intended to capture a meaningful political category for critical feminist 
efforts, and non-oppressed females do not fall within that category (though they may be 
interesting for other reasons).9  
So, in Haslanger’s view, we want to pick out meaningful political categories, and to do so we 
need to sacrifice extensional adequacy.  
                                                 
7 Haslanger, 223–24. 
8 Haslanger, 230. 
9 Haslanger, 239. 
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No Epistemic Trouble 
I will now turn to Simion’s argument against Haslanger’s analysis of ‘woman’. Haslanger’s 
analysis relies on claims about the function of ‘woman’, and of gender concepts more 
generally. Simion’s objection is based on some observations about functional items more 
generally. I will outline the objection, before turning to where I think it goes wrong. 
We can start with Simion’s observations about functional items.10 First, when a functional 
item fails to serve its primary function (or serves its primary function, but in an abnormal 
way) we say that the item is malfunctioning. Take a knife. The primary function of a knife is 
to cut things, so when a knife fails to cut—e.g. when it is blunt—we say that it is 
malfunctioning. Note that this “malfunctioning talk” is value-laden. A malfunctioning knife 
is a bad knife qua knife (though it may be good in other respects e.g. as a tool for crushing 
garlic).  
Second, functional items can serve multiple functions. Take, again, a knife. Knives serve 
other functions besides cutting. Some knives are aesthetically pleasing, so serve the function 
of being nice to look at. Note that, when a functional item fails to perform its primary 
function but still serves some of these additional functions, we still say it is malfunctioning. 
A blunt knife may still be nice to look at, but it is a malfunctioning knife all the same.  
Applying this to concepts, Simion holds that concepts are “representational devices”. That is, 
their primary function is to refer to whatever it is they are meant to refer to. So the primary 
function of the concept ‘chair’ is to pick out chairs, and the primary function of the concept 
                                                 
10 Simion, ‘Epistemic Trouble for Engineering “Woman”’, 93–96. 
7 
 
‘woman’ is to pick out women. Of course, it may be that some concepts serve other, non-
representational functions. Some concepts may serve social and political functions. But when 
they fail to serve their primary function of representing the world (or serve this function, but 
in an abnormal way), we would say that they are malfunctioning, even if they are still serving 
these other functions. Malfunctioning concepts are bad concepts qua concepts (though they 
may be good in other respects). 
These observations lead to Simion’s objection to Haslanger: 
[W]hatever other functions the concept of ‘woman’ might serve – epistemic, moral, 
social, political etc. –, its main function, like with any representational device is to 
represent the world. The main function of ‘woman’ is to pick out women. 
In line with all functional items, a concept of ‘woman’ that fails to fulfill its main, 
epistemic representational function reliably is malfunctioning. Furthermore, in virtue of 
being malfunctioning, it is not a good concept qua concept – i.e., a good token of its type. 
If Haslanger’s ‘woman’ fails to be a good concept qua concept, plausibly, it will not be a 
better concept than its predecessor. If so, Haslanger’s project will fail to qualify as an 
ameliorative project: it will not have engineered better ways for us to think about the 
world.11 
But, as we have seen, Haslanger’s analysis of ‘woman’ is clearly not extensionally adequate. 
It does not pick out all and only women. So Haslanger’s proposal that we should adopt her 
analysis as our concept of ‘woman’ must be rejected. Her proposed concept is not a good 
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concept qua concept. Simion concludes that Haslanger’s engineering project must fail. 
Indeed, as an explicitly revisionary project, it was doomed to fail. Any revisionary project is 
going to sacrifice representational accuracy, and so is going to deliver us a concept that is bad 
qua concept.12 
So much for the objection. I will now turn to why I think it fails. Simion tells us that concepts 
have the primary function of representing the world because “our concepts are mainly there 
to help us come [to] know the world around us.”13 While this may be true for some concepts, 
I don’t think it is true for all concepts. Consider social kind concepts like ‘husband’ and 
‘wife’.14 These concepts refer to social roles that are in part created and maintained by our 
practices involving them. If we decided to apply these terms in different ways, then—perhaps 
                                                 
12 Simion also suggests that, if it is bad qua concept, it will not serve the desired political 
purposes. She says that “the only reason why the concept of ‘woman’ has any political 
significance, to begin with, is because it picks out women reliably. Were it to fail to do so, it 
would likely also fail to have much in the way of political impact” Simion, 97. But it isn’t 
obvious that a concept can have political significance only if it reliably picks out what it is 
meant to pick out. Some politically significant concepts might fail to pick out anything at all 
because they lack a stable meaning (e.g. ‘fake news’, ‘post-truth/factual politics’). More 
generally, I don’t think the political significance of a concept need have much to do with 
what it refers to (consider concepts like ‘socialism’, which—at least in the US—seem to have 
a significance entirely disconnected from what they refer to). 
13 Simion, 93. 
14 Cf. Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique, 131. 
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over a long period of time—the social roles themselves might change. (This has, of course, 
happened with some social kind concepts). So we can say that social kind concepts serve to 
shape the social world. We have these concepts because they play a role in helping us 
organise the social world. Of course, this is entirely consistent with thinking that social kind 
concepts also serve to represent the world. The point is just that they don’t serve to shape the 
world in virtue of serving to represent the world. 
On Haslanger’s view, gender concepts like ‘woman’ are social kind concepts.15 As she puts 
it: 
[G]ender is not a classification scheme based simply on anatomical or biological 
differences, but should be understood as a system of social categories that can only be 
defined by reference to a network of social relations.16 
The concept ‘woman’ refers to social structures that are in part (although only in part) created 
and maintained by our practices involving the concept. If we decided to apply the term 
‘woman’ in different ways then—perhaps over a long period of time—these social structures 
themselves might change. If Haslanger’s analysis of gender concepts plays the political role 
she wants it to, then it will be part of (though only a part of) a social change by which the 
systems of oppression relative to which ‘woman’ is defined will be dismantled. Note that this 
is not to say that this change will occur, or that it could occur in a short time-frame. The point 
is just that it might. Note also that, as with social kind concepts more generally, this is all 
                                                 
15 You might deny this, but then the objection would be very different to Simion’s. 
16 Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique, 130. 
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entirely consistent with thinking that the concept ‘woman’ also serves to represent the world. 
The point, again, is just that it doesn’t serve to shape the world in virtue of serving to 
represent the world. 
If this is right, then Simion’s objection fails. ‘Woman’—like social kind concepts more 
generally—has the primary function of shaping the social world. Haslanger’s proposed 
analysis of ‘woman’ would malfunction if there were a problem with the way in which it 
shaped (or had the potential to shape) the social world (see below). But it doesn’t malfunction 
simply because it isn’t extensionally adequate. I therefore conclude that there is no 
“epistemic” trouble for Haslanger’s engineering account of ‘woman’. 
Broader Context 
I want to finish by drawing out two consequences from my discussion. The first has to do 
with the debate over Haslanger’s account of race and gender concepts. The second has to do 
with conceptual engineering projects in philosophy more generally. 
First, I have argued that Simion’s attempt to show that there is epistemic trouble for 
Haslanger’s engineering of ‘woman’ fails. A social kind concept may fall short with respect 
to representational accuracy, yet still shape (or have the potential to shape) the world in ways 
that we regard as good or desirable. Any representational failing need not invalidate the 
(potential for) political success. However, this is not to say that Haslanger’s definition of 
‘woman’ would shape the world in ways that we regard as good. Indeed, there are excellent 
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reasons for thinking that it won’t. In a recent paper17, Katharine Jenkins argues that 
Haslanger’s definition is problematic on the grounds that it marginalises trans women. But 
Jenkins’ point is not that Haslanger’s definition is extensionally inadequate. Her point is 
rather that the way in which it is extensionally inadequate perpetuates injustices. Haslanger’s 
definition is therefore to be rejected on feminist grounds. This might suggest something very 
interesting: perhaps feminist political goals will be best served by analyses of gender 
concepts that are extensionally adequate. But the crucial point for our purposes is that the 
value of extensionally adequacy is secured via its consonance with feminist political goals. 
Second, while I have argued that Simion fails to show that there is epistemic trouble for 
Haslanger’s engineering of ‘woman’, Simion’s argument would certainly show that there is 
epistemic trouble for engineering approaches that don’t target social kind concepts. While 
social kind concepts may have the primary function of shaping the world, it is not plausible 
that all concepts have the primary function of shaping the world. Some concepts merely serve 
to represent it. This point is important because in the recent literature on “conceptual 
engineering” some authors have defended engineering approaches to a range of concepts 
                                                 
17 Katharine Jenkins, ‘Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of 
Woman’, Ethics 126, no. 2 (2015): 394–421. 
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including (but not limited to) truth18, knowledge19 and normative concepts.20 Absent reason to 
think these are social kind concepts, these authors face precisely the sort of trouble Simion 
thinks Haslanger faces. (For my part, I think knowledge is a social kind concept, but that just 
means I get into trouble elsewhere!). So Simion’s objection may well work against several 
authors. It just won’t work against Haslanger. 
                                                 
18 Kevin Scharp, Replacing Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
19 Davide Fassio and Robin McKenna, ‘Revisionary Epistemology’, Inquiry 58, no. 7–8 
(2015): 755–79.. 
20 David Plunkett and Timothy Sundell, ‘Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and 
Evaluative Terms’, Philosophers’ Imprint 13 (2013): 1–37. 
